Cellular Internet
access Yet, security and privacy issues in femtocell-enabled cellular networks,
such as UMTS and LTE, still need to be fully addressed by the bodies.we review significant
threats to the security and privacy of femtocell-enabled cellular networks. We
also propose novel solution directions in order to tackle some of these threats
by drawing inspiration from solutions to similar challenges in wireless data
networks such as WLANs and mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs).
The use of mobile
devices has changed since the advent of digital technologies such as GSM. What
started as a voice only service, has been upgraded mobile networks are used by
more than 4 billion users worldwide. One effective way to meet the increasing
demand for data rates is to deploy femtocells, which are low-power base
stations that connect to the mobile operator through the subscriber’s
residential to support data traffic as well. With modern smartphones, users are
able to browse the Inter-net and obtain services such as ebanking, navigation,
social networking and recommendations based on the subscriber’s location.
Femtocells, which are low-power and low-range base stations for cellular
networks installed by users at their own premises, are believed to meet the
surge in data rates that these multimedia and interactive services require.
They offload the macrocell network and provide backhaul connections to the
cellular operators’ networks through the users’ residential broadband accesses.
Long Term Evolution
(LTE) is the mobile network tech-nology for the next generation mobile
communications, as defined by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). In
addition to features such as increased data-rates, lower latencies and better
spectral efficiency, one of the most in-teresting aspects is the radically
novel all-IP core network architecture, known as Evolved Packet Core (EPC). LTE
is expected to make extensive use of user-installed femtocells, in order to
achieve its goals of spectral efficiency and high-speed for a greater number of
users. It is clear that the sensitivity and confidentiality of users and data
transiting in such digital cellular networks is paramount both to businesses
and private users.
The issue of user
identity protection was already raised in the early GSM networks, and the
solution that has been adopted ever since has never been substantially
revisited. With the ongoing migration towards all-IP and femtocell-enabled
cellular networks, the legacy solution might not be appropri-ately suited
anymore. In fact, GSM, UMTS and LTE standards mandate the use of unlinkable
temporary identifiers to protect the
identity of mobile devices at the air interface, but the capillary deployment
of femtocells might render this insufficient to guarantee a satisfactory level
of protection for the users. TMSIs are
usually unchanged in a given location (or tracking) area, which is composed by
up to a hundred adjacent cells, and femtocells could make it possible for
malicious users not only to track the movements of mobile subscribers, but due
to the low range, to have an unprecedented accuracy as well. For instance, such
tracking attacks could be perpetrated by curious employers, in order to monitor
whether an employee is visiting a competitor, or by governmental agencies, in
order to illegitimately track people’s locations.
